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Abstract
Electricity trade across regions is often considered welfare enhancing.
We show in this paper that this could be reconsidered if environmental
externalities are taken into account. We consider two cases where trade is
beneficial, before accounting for environmental damages: first, when two
regions with the same technology display some demand heterogeneity;
second when one region endowed with hydropower arbitrages with its
"thermal" neighbor. Our results show that under reasonable demand and
supply elasticities, trade comes with an additional environmental cost.
This calls for integrating environmental externalities into market reforms
when redesigning the electricity sector. Two North American applications
illustrate our results: trade between Pennsylvania and New York, and
trade between hydro-rich Quebec and New York.
Keywords: Electricity trade; Hydropower; greenhouse gas emissions.
1 Introduction
Electricity reforms across the world increasingly integrate various regions. In
the United States, federal "open access" to transmission networks was mandated
in 1996 through order 888 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In
the European Union, the 2003 directive "EU common rules for the internal
market in electricity" even go further by requiring all members to open their
internal market and to offer choice to consumers. Integration reforms are also
under way in Latin America and Africa. See for instance Pineau et al. (2004)
and Pineau (2008). If little disagreement exists on the theoretical economic
benefits of international trade (see for intance Bhagwati et al., 1998) and of
electricity reforms, the environmental impacts of interregional electricity trade
have not been studied in great details. A large literature exists on electricity
∗This paper was written while the first author was visiting University of Montreal, whose
hospitality is gratefully acknowledeged.
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market reforms (see for instance Stoft, 2002), but it largely ignores integration
of different regions and environmental consequences.
DeCiccoa et al. (1992), however, raised some early concerns over new trans-
mission lines in North America, and explore how efficiency improvements in
consumption could avoid the need for these lines. Their focus is however not
on emissions (mostly CO2, NOx and SOx), which are usually considered the
main environmental issues in the electricity sector. An important exception to
this lack of attention on electricity, trade and the environment comes from the
work of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America. In
2002, they released a series of reports directly assessing possible environmental
challenges and opportunities under a more integrated North American electric-
ity market. See for instance CEC (2002). This work, however, revolves around
energy models calibrated with given loads that have to be supplied (completely
inelastic demand), and therefore offers limited validity in describing real elec-
tricity markets, where some demand elasticity exists, especially in the longer
run. See also Bernard et al. (2004) for such a study of the impact on emissions
of free-trade in the electricity sector in the North-American Northeast region
(where important hydro and thermal capacity are available).
Furthermore, maybe because the project of mandating "Standard Electric-
ity Market Design" in regional transmission organizations (RTOs) across the
US was abandoned (FERC, 2005), the interest in environmental impacts of
electricity trade decreased. Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions related to the
electricity sector remain however very important: about 25% of the worldwide
GHG emissions come from the electricity sector (Baumert et al., 2005). There
are many reasons to believe that a lot of environmental improvements could be
achieved in electricity, notably through better resource allocation by the means
of larger scale planning, capacity sharing and better electricity pricing (CEC,
2002). An example of poor resource allocation in this sector is, for instance, the
case of hydropower in the US and Canada. In the US, most hydropower is sold
at cost through federal non-profit power marketing administrations (like the
Bonneville Power Administration), under the authority of the US Department
of Energy. Similarly, in Canada, provinces such as British Columbia, Manitoba
and Quebec, produce about 280 TWh of hydropower (Statistics Canada, 2008),
sold at (low) historical cost within their own region. Neighboring provinces (Al-
berta, Saskatchewan, Ontario), because of their lack of access to hydropower,
need thermal generation capacity and have electricity prices about twice higher
(for price comparisons, see for instance Hydro-Quebec, 2008).
The benefits of trade between such "hydro" and "thermal" regions are ob-
vious: hydropower plants can "shave" high production costs during peak hours
while storing water during base periods, by buying cheaper thermal base load
power. Crampes and Moreaux (2001) provide an economic model to study in-
teractions between hydro and thermal units. Rangel (2008) reviews the market
and regulatory issues that can arise in such situations, with a focus on possible
market power abuses. He also reviews the literature of hydropower-dominated
competition. Billette de Villemeur and Vinella (2008) extend Crampes and
Moreaux (2001) to look at the optimal management when emissions from ther-
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mal units are accounted for.
This paper aims at providing some general results to better understand when
electricity trade can be environmentally damaging, in the absence of any mech-
anism to account for environmental externalities, as it is currently the case for
CO2. In particular, we are interested in understanding and making more explicit
the role of own price elasticity of demand and supply in electricity trade. Indeed,
although elasticity plays a very important role in markets, notably to mitigate
market power and price volatility, it has been the focus of very few studies.
Among them are Lafferty et al. (2001) and IEA (2003), taking a regulator and
public policy perspective. Another notable exception is Siddiqui (2003), which
looks at the role of price elasticity in determining the market equilibrium in
a competitive spot market for electricity with forward contracts. Interregional
trade is however not the focus of these studies. Many empirical studies estimate
elasticities, with a focus on short and long term own price elasticity of demand.
However, both time-of-use (TOU) elasticities and regional elasticities are in-
creasingly being studied. Dahl (1993) provides a wide survey of energy price
elasticities (see also Wade, 2003). For a more recent survey of TOU elasticities,
see Lijesen (2007). Regional price elasticities analysis for electricity demand
can be found in Bernstein and Griffin (2005), for the United States, and NIEIR
(2007), for Australian States. To our knowledge, however, price elasticity of
supply has not been estimated in the literature.
In order to study the links between electricity trade, environmental impact
and price elasticities, two very common cases are covered. First, the situation
of two neighboring regions equipped with similar generation technologies, but
facing different demand levels and different price elasticities. Second, the situa-
tion of a "hydro" region (with regulated price), neighboring a "thermal" region,
selling electricity at marginal cost. Our results show that because the quantity
sold is likely to grow when there is trade between regions, environmental impacts
also grow.1 These results hold under conditions on demand and supply price
elasticities we establish, and that are commonly satisfied in electricity markets.
The next section presents in greater details the model and our results. Sec-
tion 3 provides some numerical illustrations and discussion points.
2 Trade resulting from demand and technology
heterogeneity
In the next subsections, we consider first a one-period situation with two re-
gions, both competitive (pricing at marginal cost), but facing different demand
levels. If environmental damages are not accounted for, trade, that emerges as a
result of this demand heterogeneity, improves the electricity market outcomes.
Then, in the following subsection, trade emergence (and benefits) come from
1We only focus on the electricity market, and therefore consider that there is no substitute
to electricity. In reality, there are substitutes to electricity consumption (such as higher energy
efficiency or alternative fuels), with other environmental consequences. It is however beyond
the scope of this paper to study these secondary environmental impacts.
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technological differences: one region is endowed with hydropower and regulates
price in its internal market, while the other region has thermal generation and
is competitive. During the two-period situation (with demand heterogeneity
between periods), the hydro region can arbitrage in the thermal one.
We assume that environmentally damaging emissions only come from the
thermal technology and are strictly increasing with production.
2.1 Same technology, different demand, one period
Assume that two regions share an identical technology (presumably thermal,
with similar costs and emissions) and that both markets are competitive. Elec-
tricity is not storable but there is demand heterogeneity so that trade may allow
the overall production cost to decrease. Without any loss of generality, we as-
sume that in autarky (superscript A) price pA is lower in region T , compared
to the other T , because of its lower demand:
pA = C0
¡
QA
¢
< pA = C0
³
Q
A
´
,
where C (·), the production cost function, is increasing and convex, as it can
realistically be assumed in a thermal system. QA and Q
A
are the quantities
produced and consumed in both regions.
Allowing exchange between both regions results in
p = C0
¡
QD +QX
¢
= p = C 0
³
Q
D −QX
´
,
where QX is the quantity exchanged between regions and QD and Q
D
are the
quantities required to meet local demand in, respectively, regions T and T (QS
and Q
S
represent supply in T and T ). However, in order to be more realistic we
limit trade to the transmission line capacity K, so that QX = K. We assume
that this transmission capacity is not used strategically by its owners. The total
rent associated to it is R =
¡
p− p
¢
K. We do not make any assumption on how
this rent is distributed among buyers, sellers and transmission right owners.
This means that a price difference will continue to exist between the two
regions:
p = C0
¡
QD +K
¢
< p = C 0
³
Q
D −K
´
.
Four basic but important results are now discussed. First, the welfare im-
plications for the exporting region, producing QS =
¡
QD +K
¢
and selling it at
price p. Second, the welfare implications for the importing region, producing
Q
S
=
³
Q
D −K
´
and selling it at p. Then, the combined welfare impacts, ig-
noring environmental consequences. Fourthly, the conditions under which such
trade can actually have a negative impact on the environment.
Figure 1 illustrates the situation. Region T (right panel) produces QS and
exports quantity K to T (left panel). This reduces price in T , from pA to p, but
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increases price in T from pA to p. These price changes affect both consumers
and producers, while a rent R is created from such trade and congestion.
(High price, importing K) (Low price, exporting K)
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Figure 1. Trade under Demand Heterogeneity
2.1.1 Exporting region T
Proposition 1 It is always beneficial for a region facing a lower demand to
export. If this region gets a share of the transmission rent, it is never optimal to
allow trade up to price equalization. In the exporting region, trade redistribute
wealth from consumers to producers.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is obvious, but it is useful to recall it for two reasons. First, the
transmission constraint K between the two regions plays a key role in setting
the profit level for the exporting region (π). T -producers require access to the
market in T , but not to the point of reaching an equal price level in both regions,
if they own a share of the transmission rights. They may not directly control
the level of K but will certainly lobby the transmission company in order to set
a transmission capacity close to their interest.
Second, internally, consumers and producers in T have diverging interests:
exports from T to T raise the price pA to p. Consumers will therefore apply
some political pressure to prevent a connection to be established between the
two regions. Overall, however, producers and consumers in T gain from trade,
and in theory some transfer mechanisms could be designed to compensate T -
consumers from higher prices, in such a way that the two groups increase their
position with trade, compared to autarky.
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2.1.2 Importing region T
Proposition 2 Trade always improves upon welfare in the importing region;
however, while consumers gain, producers lose.
Proof. See Appendix.
In T , as illustrated in Figure 1 and as it can also be obviously concluded,
trade reduces price. This benefits consumers but hurts producers. This rep-
resents an incentive for producers to lobby against transmission lines making
such trade possible, unless, of course, if they get a significant share of the trans-
mission capacity rent. To some extent, it can explain why competitive regions
such as Alberta (Canada) remain little interconnected with their neighbours,
producing at lower costs. The empirical impact of such trade has been studied
by Serletis and Dormaar (2007), and indeed imports into the Alberta market
have been shown to reduce electricity price, which led Alberta producers to try
to limit the impact of imports.
2.1.3 Combined regions
Proposition 3 Neglecting environmental effects and transmission line construc-
tion costs, trade improves upon total welfare while prices are not equalized.
This proposition simply results from combining welfare impacts in both re-
gions (see also the appendix):
dW
dK
= C 0
³
Q
D −K
´
− C 0
¡
QD +K
¢
= p− p ≥ 0.
This result explains why trade is considered beneficial and promoted as good
economic policy. However, marginal cost functions C 0 (·) are private cost func-
tions that do not include the environmental costs of electricity production. As
thermal electricity production from fossil fuels (coal, natural gas and oil) re-
sult in GHG emissions, among other gases, this welfare improvement for con-
sumers and producers ignores the environmental costs of electricity production.
If trade increases total electricity consumption (and therefore production), this
reduces trade’s benefits and may even make trade undesirable. We now turn
our attention to this issue: when is trade actually increasing consumption and,
consequently, the environmental impact?
2.1.4 Environmental Impact
Whether the overall consumption (and hence production) increases with trade
depends on the price elasticity of demand in both regions (ε and ε), on the price
elasticity of supply (η and η), on both demand levels and on the capacity of the
transmission line.
Proposition 4 Trade increases consumption when
ε
ε
>
η
η
³
1−K/QD
´
¡
1 +K/QD
¢ .
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Proof. See Appendix.
This result provides a general condition that make precise when electricity
trade increases total consumption, and therefore has a greater environmental
impact (assuming environmental impact is increasing with production). It ties
the ratio of demand elasticity to the ratio of supply elasticity, along with the
transmission constraint (K) and demand levels (QD and Q
D
).
The (absolute value of the) demand price elasticity is often observed to be
lower when demand is higher: ε < ε (see some studies reviewed in Lijesen,
2007). Supply elasticity is lower when demand is higher (as capacity becomes
more and more binding), so η ¿ η. If these two inequalities hold, then the left
hand-side of the condition would be greater than the right hand-side. Therefore,
trade would lead to higher consumption levels and have a higher environmental
impact. Illustrations of this result are presented in section 3.
2.2 Different technologies and regulations, two periods:
the impact of hydro arbitraging
Our model of the electricity market with a hydropower region (H) follows Cram-
pes and Moreaux (2001). The generation technology of the other region is
thermal and is characterized by increasing and convex costs, as previously. Hy-
dropower production is constrained by a known stock of water S. We assume
that the hydropower system (reservoirs, dams and generating units) is calibrated
such that this supply S exactly meets demand in this hydropower region. Yet,
the stock S offers room for arbitrage, as water reserves can be freely allocated
across time.
In order to illustrate the effects of this arbitrage, we shall analyze a very sim-
ple two-period model. More precisely, we assume that region H only produces
hydropower while region T holds no hydro capacity (only thermal). Clearly,
absent demand fluctuations in T price would be constant and there would be
no place for trade, unless the H-producer is not compelled anymore to supply
customers in its region. If, however, demand (and hence price) happens to vary
in T , intertemporal arbitrage may help improve profitability and efficiency. We
maintain our assumtion that transmission rights are not used strategically. To
display clear cut results, we assume that they are either free or owned by the
H-producer.
With regulated price in region H, neither price nor demand vary in that
region. This says that the sum of the trade flows should add to exactly zero (no
"loss of resource" for H-consumers). As a result, it must be the case that total
production and consumption are equal in region T .
Let pAT and Q
A
T denote respectively the price and quantity in market T in
the high (or peak) period, in autarky. The price pA
T
and the quantity QA
T
denote
the same values during the low (or base) period. By definition:
pAT
³
Q
A
T
´
= C 0T
³
Q
A
T
´
> pA
T
³
QA
T
´
= C 0T
³
QA
T
´
.
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If there is an exchange of K between region H and T , then we have
pT
³
Q
D
T
´
= pT
³
Q
S
T +K
´
= C 0T
³
Q
S
T
´
and p
T
³
QD
T
´
= p
T
³
QS
T
−K
´
= C 0T
³
QS
T
´
.
Figure 2 illustrates the situation, which is very similar to the previous case
(with trade between two thermal regions, T and T ). In Figure 2, however,
only region T is illustrated, but each panel reflects a different period: the high
demand period (left) and the low demand period (right). With trade constrained
at K, price decrease from pAT to pT during the high demand period, due to
imports from H. Demand increases to Q
D
T due to the lower price. During the
low demand period, price increases from pA
T
to p
T
, because H needs to get back
the amount of energy K it previously sent to T . Demand decreases to QD
T
. This
trade results in a profit πH for the H-producer.
High demand period (T) Low demand period (T)
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Figure 2. Trade under Technology Heterogeneity
In Figure 2, the increase in demand
¯¯¯
Q
D
T −Q
A
¯¯¯
during the high demand
period (left panel), appears to be larger than the decrease in demand
¯¯¯
QD
T
−QA
¯¯¯
during the low demand period (right panel). This would mean that overall,
trade increases total consumption (and production), as consumption in region
H remains equal due to the constant regulated price. Once again, our results
show for the two regions the exact condition under which total consumption
increases with trade.
2.2.1 Region H
Proposition 5 It is always beneficial for a region with hydropower to arbitrage
between high and low-demand periods within the thermal region. It is never
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optimal for the hydropower region to allow trade up to price equalization.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the hydropower region trades with the thermal one, it benefits from
trade. However, in order to benefit from trade, the price differential between
the two periods,
³
pT − pT
´
, has to remain strictly positive. This can only be
achieved under a transmission constraint. The H-producer will therefore have
an incentive to maintain it. H-consumers do not suffer from trade because price
remain regulated in region H.
2.2.2 Region T
Proposition 6 Trade improves upon welfare in the thermal region, however,
T -consumers and T -producers can gain or lose depending on price and demand
levels, transmission capacity and demand and supply price elasticities.
Proof. See Appendix.
While trade is clearly beneficial in region T as a whole, there is no clear
results on whether both consumers and producers gain, or only one of the two
groups. Indeed, as shown in the appendix, under some conditions both group
can gain from trade, but it could also be the case that one group is hurt by
trade. Again, what occurs depends on the demand and supply price elasticities
in both periods, as well as price, demand and transmission capacity levels.
2.2.3 Combined regions
Proposition 7 Neglecting environmental effects and transmission line construc-
tion costs, trade improves upon total welfare while prices are not equalized.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although trade clearly benefits both regions, the optimal situation where
price are equalized in both time periods would destroy the trade benefits for the
H-producer. There will therefore be some conflict between regions over which
level of transmission should be build.
2.2.4 Environmental Impact
The environmental impact is exactly similar in this case as in the case previously
studied. Total consumption will increase if
ε
ε
>
η
η
³
1−K/QDT
´
³
1 +K/QD
T
´ .
As production remains constant in H, the increased consumption has to
be supplied from additional production in the thermal region, consequently
releasing additional GHG.
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3 Illustrations
To illustrate our results, we propose three cases. The first is a stylized exam-
ple with a calibrated increasing and convex cost function, without empirical
data. The second and third cases are based on the trade between two (mostly)
"thermal" regions (New York and Pennsylvania) and between a "thermal" and
a "hydro" region (New York and the province of Quebec, Canada). In all cases,
we don’t have to specify the demand side of the market, which maintains a
level generality in our illustrations. We simply have to assume some own-price
elasticity values for the demand of electricity. Elasticity of supply, in all cases,
is derived from the generation cost function or observed price and supply data.
3.1 Stylized Example
For the sake of illustrating our results under a typical (and rather general)
context, we use the following cost function for thermal generation:
C(QS) = c
µ
QS + exp
µ
kT
KT −QS
¶¶
.
Constants c = 3. 610 3, KT = 270 and kT = 1251. 6 were calibrated to pro-
vide familiar values for marginal thermal production costs: C 0 (0) = 10 and
C 0 (100) = 250 (in $/MWh, for instance), with initial low-cost coal-generated
electricity, then electricity generated from natural gas and finally from diesel
power plants. The system has a theoretical maximum generation capacity of
KT = 270 (MW, for instance). However, the marginal production cost quickly
becomes prohibitively high beyond 100 MW, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Marginal Production Cost
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The corresponding supply elasticity η(Q) = C
0(Q)
QC00(Q) is illustrated in Figure
4. It tends to zero as production increases.
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Figure 4. Supply Elasticity η(Q) = C
0(Q)
QC00(Q)
The condition established in Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 5, where
the Y -axis represents the ratio of peak to off-peak demand elasticity (ε/ε). The
condition is respected above the bold line (
h
η
³
1−K/QD
´i
/
£
η
¡
1 +K/QD
¢¤
),
which is always below ε/ε. The figure is drawn with QD = 40 and a transmission
capacity of 10. Demand in the "high demand" region Q
D
is varying from 50 to
100 (X-axis in Figure 5), and the line (ε/ε) = 1 is also shown. What Figure
5 illustrates is how small the ratio of demand elasticities has to be in order to
not have an increase in consumption with trade. If elasticities in both regions
are similar, then (ε/ε) ' 1, trade will lead to more consumption and a greater
environmental impact. If the ratio of demand elasticities is sufficiently small
(below the bold line), then trade will decrease overall consumption. This would
simply mean that first, the price reduction in the importing region (or during
the high demand period, in the case of the hydro arbitraging) leads to little
consumption increase, because it’s relatively inelastic. Second, the price increase
in the exporting region (or during the low demand period, in the case of the
hydro arbitraging) leads to some important consumption reduction, because it’s
relatively elastic.
As consumption in T increases (shown in X-axis), the condition becomes
more and more difficult to meet: demand elasticities in both region have to be
extremely different (relatively a lot more inelastic in the importing region) in
order to lower overall consumption.
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3.2 New York (T) - Pennsylvania (T) Illustration
The state of New York is interconnected with PJM (the region "Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland") through transmission lines that have an import limit
to New York of 3,160 MW (New York ISO, 2009a). For the sake of simplicity,
we assume in this case that this interconnection is only with Pennsylvania (the
largest state of PJM and the one with the longest border with New York). Both
New York and Pennsylvania are dominated by thermal (fossil fuel) generation,
with hydro and nuclear power representing less than 25% of their generation
capacity in 2007 (EIA, 2009a).
Although the historical peak demand was higher in New York (33,939 MW;
FERC, 2009a) than in Pennsylvania (31,618 MW; FERC,2009b, based on the
21.86% PJM load share of Pennsylvania; Monitoring Analytics, 2009a), Penn-
sylvania has a larger generation capacity (45,106 MW against 39,121 MW; EIA,
2009a). It also generated in 2008 a monthly average of 18.6 TWh against only
11.7 TWh for New York (EIA, 2009b), despite very similar monthly electricity
sales within each state (12.6 TWh in Pennsylvania and 12.3 TWh in New York,
all sectors combined; EIA, 2009a). The monthly average price in 2008, how-
ever, was about 40% cheaper in Pennsylvania than in New York (EIA, 2009c):
9.34c//kWh against 16.38c//kWh. It therefore makes a lot of economic sense
for Pennsylvania to export to New York. However, these exports may or may
not be environmentally beneficial overall if this type of trade increases consump-
tion, especially since the marginal fuels in Pennsylvania are coal and natural gas
(in 2008, respectively 78% and 17% of the time; Monitoring Analytics, 2009b).
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Our result from proposition 4 allows to "test" if this trade is environmentally
damageable or not, due to a higher overall electricity production, given that all
parameters and variables can be approximated with confidence. Table 1 below
summarizes these key elements.
Value Source
Q
D
33, 939 FERC (2009a)
QD 31, 618 FERC (2009b), Monitoring Analytics (2009a)
K 3, 160 New York ISO (2009a)
ε −0.125 Bernstein and Griffin (2005, p.81)
ε −0.151 Bernstein and Griffin (2005, p.81)
η 1.64 Own estimation from EIA (2009a and b)
η 4.86 Own estimation from EIA (2009a and b)
Table 1. Key Parameters for the New York-Pennsylvania Illustration
Price elasticities of supply (η and η) in Table 1 are estimated with monthly
data, through a simple linear regression model. Although these values are very
gross approximations, they reflect the fact that on a monthly basis, electricity
generation in Pennsylvania is much more responsive to price than in New York,
where the production capacity is much tighter, as monthly production and con-
sumption numbers illustrate. Peak demand values are used simply to reflect
an extreme situation. They make it more demanding for trade to induce more
consumption; hence other values would only reinforce our conclusion.
With a demand elasticity ratio ε/ε = 0.83 greater than [η(1−K/QD)] / [η(1+
K/QD)] = 0.28, proposition 4 leads to the conclusion that overall electricity
production (and consumption) increases with trade (exports) from Pennsylvania
to New York. It would take an extremely inelastic demand in New York (−0.042
or more), or a much more elastic supply in this state (4.90 or more), to observe
a decrease in overall consumption, and hence a lower environmental footprint.
3.3 New York (T) - Quebec (H) Illustration
New York, as previously mentioned, has a thermal generation system. If it can
benefit from imports from another thermal system such as the one in Pennsyl-
vania (due to demand heterogeneity), it can also benefit from the hydropower
power system of the province of Quebec. This province regulates its electricity
price to provide a constant price to its consumers, and has planned its hy-
dropower system to meet its internal demand and to export. But if we abstract
from the energy available for export in Quebec, there are still some trading
opportunities for Quebec in New York, by simply arbitraging between high and
low prices in the New York market. In this third case, we use New York City
data (because this specific zone is highly congested), and the transmission ca-
pacity between New York and Quebec, to illustrate again the potential increase
in environmental damage such trading can have.
Table 2 summarizes the value of key parameters and variables we need to
illustrate this case.
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Value Source
Q
D
7, 017 New York ISO (2009b)
QD 4, 730 New York ISO (2009b)
K 2, 125 HQ TransEnergie (2009)
ε −0.125 Bernstein and Griffin (2005, p.81)
ε −0.151 Bernstein and Griffin (2005, p.81)
η 0.17 New York ISO (2009b)
η 0.20 New York ISO (2009b)
Table 2. Key Parameters for the New York-Quebec Illustration
Q
D
, the peak load demand, is the average of the 25% highest hourly loads in
New York City, in January 2008 (values above the highest quartile of January
2008 hourly loads; New York ISO, 2009b). QD, off-peak demand, is the average
of the 25% lowest hourly loads. We use the value K = 2, 125 MW because it is
the export capacity from Quebec to New York. This represents a higher bound
(any lower value could be used and would contribute to increase the right-hand
side of the condition).
Estimates of price elasticity for demand during peak and off peak periods
diverge in the literature. Surveys report different findings (Dahl, 1993; Lijesen,
2007), with many instance of higher elasticity values during peak load periods
(ε > ε, in absolute values). When this happens, the inequality of proposition 4
can hardly be false, as illustrated in Figure 5. However, it is also plausible that
during peak hours consumers have less options to react to prices, and hence we
could observe ε < ε. Therefore, we keep the same values as before (but any
other plausible values could be used).
Price elasticity values for supply are computed with January 2008 hourly
prices (Location Based Marginal Price) and loads (Real Time Actual Load) for
the New York City zone. Again, simple linear regression is used to compute the
slope of the supply curve during the two different periods (peak and off-peak).
The demand elasticity ratio ε/ε = 0.83 is again greater than [η(1−K/QD)]
/ [η(1 + K/QD)] = 0.41. This means that arbitraging between peak and off-
peak periods leads to an overall greater production in New York. In this case,
it would take an extremely inelastic demand during the peak period (−0.061
or more), or a much more elastic supply during peak period (0.35 or more),
to observe a decrease in overall consumption, and hence a lower environmental
footprint. Alternatively, with all other values being equal, trade would lead to
a lower overall consumption level only if K was under 79 MW.
3.4 Discussion
What these simple, but still realistic, illustrations show is that electricity trade,
under very plausible conditions, lead to an increased overall consumption. Con-
sequently, production is higher and the environmental impact grows. As GHG
emissions become a worldwide concern and as electricity markets are increas-
ingly being integrated, such results reinforce the argument that externalities
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have to be internalized in some ways into electricity prices, to avoid ignoring
environmental impact when assessing trade gains.
The application of our main result over an extended period of time (with
hourly loads), would allow a complete empirical assessment of the increased
consumption induced by trade. The real environmental impact would have to
account for the different emission levels along the supply curve as, for instance,
coal-generated electricity is more CO2 intensive than natural gas-generated elec-
tricity (about twice as intensive). This would mean that "cheap" production
during off-peak hours are more environmentally damaging that "expensive" gen-
eration during peak hours. Consequently, the net environmental result of the
higher consumption level could be even more difficult to assess, due to different
externalities at different production levels. Indeed, to continue with the above
example, if production during the low-demand period (or region) increases by
δ, then production in the high-demand period (or region) would have to de-
crease by 2δ to obtain an "emission-neutral" net result. Under current market
conditions, this would be very difficult to obtain.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates issues seldom considered in the integration of electricity
markets: welfare gains for both trade partners and welfare change for consumers
and producers in each region. In addition, and this is its main results, it es-
tablishes that trade leads to higher consumption levels, and hence likely larger
environmental impact, under very realistic conditions. The contribution of this
paper is to center the analysis on price elasticities of both supply and demand.
Three cases illustrates the main result. In each of them, environmental impact
grows with trade.
Future work should focus on a thorough assessment of electricity trade be-
tween two regions and include actual emission levels of different fuels used in
electricity generation.
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5 Appendix: Proof of Propostions 1 to 7
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Welfare impact in T . It is always beneficial for a region facing a lower demand
to export. If this region gets a share of the transmission rent, it is never optimal
to allow trade up to price equalization. In the exporting region, trade redistribute
wealth from consumers to producers.
Assume that trade is limited by transmission capacity K, so that QX = K.
The effect of a small increase inK on the exporting region is obtained as follows.
By differentiating the marginal pricing identity p = C 0
¡
QD +K
¢
with respect
to K, one gets:
dp
dK
=
"Ã
dQD
dp
!
dp
dK
+ 1
#
C 00
¡
QD +K
¢
.
This rewrites directly as
dp
dK
=
C 00
¡
QD +K
¢
1 +
³−dQD
dp
´
C00
¡
QD +K
¢ ≥ 0.
The marginal change in consumer (net) surplus V writes
dV
dK
= −QD
dp
dK
,
which is negative.
Assume that the transmission rights owner makes a rent
R =
¡
p− p
¢
K.
The producers’ profits π write π = p
¡
QD +K
¢
−C
¡
QD +K
¢
. Thus the mar-
ginal change in firms profits induced by trade is :
dπ
dK
=
dp
dK
¡
QD +K
¢
+
¡
p− C 0
¡
QD +K
¢¢Ã
1 +
dQD
dp
dp
dK
!
=
dp
dK
¡
QD +K
¢
≥ 0,
as long as the capacity constraint is binding i.e. p > C 0
¡
QD +K
¢
= p .
Under the very same conditions, trade yields to a social welfare variation in
the exporting region that writes
dW
dK
=
dV
dK
+
dπ
dK
=
dp
dK
K,
which is always positive.
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In the exporting region, trade induces redistribution from consumers to pro-
ducers. The net (marginal) impact of this redistribution is zero. The improve-
ment in welfare comes from the marginal increase in profits made on the external
market (as a result of the increase in price). Trade always improves upon au-
tarky. The transmission rights owner makes a rent R =
¡
p− p
¢
K. It is never in
its interest to increase the exporting capacity K up to a point where the price
differential washes out.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Welfare impact in T . Trade always improves upon welfare in the importing
region; however, while consumers gain, producers lose.
As previously, by differentiating of the marginal pricing equation p = C0
³
Q
D −K
´
,
one gets the marginal effect of an increase in K upon the market price:
dp
dK
=
−C00
³
Q
D −K
´
1 +
³
−dQD
dp
´
C00
³
Q
D −K
´ ≤ 0.
In the importing region, the change in capacity yields to a variation of consumer
net surplus that writes
dV
dK
= −QD dp
dK
,
which is positive. The marginal impact on producers profits writes
dπ
dK
=
dp
dK
³
Q
D −K
´
,
which is negative. However, the marginal impact on welfare is always positive:
dW
dK
=
dV
dK
+
dπ
dK
= −K dp
dK
.
5.3 Total welfare and transmission rights owner
Combined welfare impact. Neglecting environmental effects and transmis-
sion line construction costs, trade improves upon total welfare while prices are
not equalized.
Proposition 3 is proved in the process of studying the impact upon welfare
of transmission capacity ownership.
If the rent made by the transmission right owner is given by R =
¡
p− p
¢
K,
then effect of a marginal variation in K writes
dR
dK
=
¡
p− p
¢
+K
µ
dp
dK
−
dp
dK
¶
.
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The variation in total welfare is given by
dW
dK
=
dW
dK
+
dW
dK
+
dR
dK
= p− p.
The capacity K∗ that maximizes welfare is such that p = p. The capacity that
maximizes the rent R is defined by the implicit equation
KR =
µ
dp
dK
− dp
dK
¶−1 ¡
p− p
¢
.
Clearly KR < K∗. If the transmission capacity is owned by the importing
region, the capacity that maximizes the region welfare is defined implicitly by
(dR/dK) +
¡
dW/dK
¢
= 0, which yields K
K
∗
=
µ
dp
dK
¶−1 ¡
p− p
¢
.
If the transmission capacity is owned by the exporting region, the capacity that
maximizes the region welfare is defined implicitly by (dR/dK)+(dW/dK) = 0,
which yields K
K∗ =
µ
−dp
dK
¶−1 ¡
p− p
¢
.
Clearly both K
∗
, K∗ are higher than KR and smaller than K∗.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Environmental impact. Trade increases consumption when
ε
ε
>
η
η
³
1−K/QD
´
¡
1 +K/QD
¢ .
The effect of a marginal increase in transmission capacity K upon aggregate
demand QD writes
dQD
dK
=
Ã
dQD
dp
!
dp
dK
+
Ã
dQ
D
dp
!
dp
dK
,
where
dp
dK
=
C 00
¡
QD +K
¢
1 +
³−dQD
dp
´
C00
¡
QD +K
¢ ,
dp
dK
=
−C 00
³
Q
D −K
´
1 +
³
−dQD
dp
´
C00
³
Q
D −K
´ .
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This says that
dQD
dK
=
³
−dQD
dp
´
C 00
³
Q
D −K
´
1 +
³
−dQD
dp
´
C 00
³
Q
D −K
´ −
µ
−dQD
dp
¶
C00
¡
QD +K
¢
1 +
³−dQD
dp
´
C 00
¡
QD +K
¢ .
Let ε and ε be the (absolute value of the) own-price demand elasticity in the
exporting and importing region respectively:
ε =
p
QD
Ã
−dQD
dp
!
and ε =
p
Q
D
Ã
−dQD
dp
!
.
Similarly, let η and η be the supply elasticities in the exporting and importing
region respectively:
η =
C 0
¡
QD +K
¢¡
QD +K
¢
C00
¡
QD +K
¢ ,
η =
C 0
³
Q
D −K
´
³
Q
D −K
´
C00
³
Q
D −K
´ .
The marginal change in total demand thus rewrites
dQD
dK
=
QD
p εC
00
³
Q
D −K
´
1 + Q
D
p εC
00
³
Q
D −K
´ − εQ
D
p C
00 ¡QD +K¢
1 + ε
QD
p C
00 ¡QD +K¢
=
εQ
D
η
³
Q
D −K
´
+ εQ
D −
εQD
η
¡
QD +K
¢
+ εQD
=
"
1 +
η
ε
Ã
1− K
Q
D
!#−1
−
"
1 +
η
ε
Ã
1 +
K
QD
!#−1
.
Rearranging, this yields
¡
dQD/dK
¢
> 0 if and only if
ε
ε
>
η
η
³
1−K/QD
´
¡
1 +K/QD
¢ .
If emissions increase with total production, hence demand, we have there a
necessary and sufficient condition for environmental damage to increase.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Welfare impact in the H-region. It is always beneficial for a region with
hydropower to arbitrage between high and low-demand periods with a thermal
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region. It is never optimal for the hydropower region to allow trade up to price
equalization.
By assumption, region H is regulated. Absent over-capacity "prior to trade",
the H-region is producing at capacity: QDH = Q
S
H = maxQH . The average costs
hence the price
pH = CH
¡
QSH
¢
/QSH
is given. It follows that trade has no impact upon consumers in the H-region.
Trade only impact firm H benefits. Service obligations impose the H-firm to
clear demand in region H. Thus firm H must re-import any exported amount.
We assume that exchanges are bounded by the transmission capacity so that
QX = K. As a results profits write
πH = pHQDH − CH
¡
QSH
¢
+
¡
p− p
¢
K
=
¡
p− p
¢
K,
where p and p denote respectively the price in the T -region when the H-firm is
exporting and importing, respectively. Observe that the pattern of trade does
not bear any relationships with consumption in region H, provided the amount
of trade (which is bounded by the trading capacity K) does not exceed the
difference between H-supply and H-demand.
Clearly, from πH =
¡
p− p
¢
K, it is always profitable for the H-firm (hence
for the whole region) to arbitrage between high and low demand periods in the
thermal region. However, since p ≡ p
³
Q
S
T +QX
´
is decreasing with QX = K
and p ≡ p
³
QS
T
−QX
´
is increasing with QX = K, the H-region has an interest
in limiting the capacity K.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Welfare impact in T . Trade improves upon welfare in the thermal region,
however, T -consumers and T -producers can gain or lose depending on price and
demand levels, transmission capacity and demand and supply price elasticities.
Assuming again that trade is limited by the transmission capacity (that is
QX = K), we know from previous calculus (proof of propositions 1 and 2) that
the impact on prices over the different periods writes
dp
dK
=
C 00
³
QD
T
+K
´
1 +
³−dQD
T
dp
´
C00
³
QD
T
+K
´ ,
dp
dK
=
−C 00
³
Q
D
T −K
´
1 +
µ
−dQDT
dp
¶
C00
³
Q
D
T −K
´ .
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It follows that
dVT
dK
= −QDT
dp
dK
−QD
T
dp
dK
=
Q
D
T C
00
³
Q
D
T −K
´
1 +
µ
−dQDT
dp
¶
C00
³
Q
D
T −K
´ − QDT C00
³
QD
T
+K
´
1 +
³−dQD
T
dp
´
C 00
³
QD
T
+K
´
=
pµ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε
−
p³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
which is positive if and only if
p
p
>
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
.
The marginal impact on industry profits writes
dπT
dK
=
dp
dK
³
Q
D
T −K
´
+
dp
dK
³
QD
T
+K
´
=
³
QD
T
+K
´
C 00
³
QD
T
+K
´
1 +
³−dQD
T
dp
´
C00
³
QD
T
+K
´ −
³
Q
D
T −K
´
C00
³
Q
D
T −K
´
1 +
µ
−dQDT
dp
¶
C 00
³
Q
D
T −K
´
=
p
³
1 + KQD
T
´
³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
−
p
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε
,
which is positive if and only if
p
p
<
³
1 + KQD
T
´
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
Observe that trade may benefit both consumers and producers ifµ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
<
p
p
<
³
1 + KQD
T
´
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
µ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
.
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In all cases it is beneficial for the region T
dWT
dK
=
µ
dp
dK
− dp
dK
¶
K
=
p K
QDTµ
1− K
QDT
¶
η + ε
+
p KQD
T³
1 + KQD
T
´
η + ε
≥ 0,
despite the rent R made by the Hydro-monopolist.
5.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Combined welfare impact. Neglecting environmental effects and transmis-
sion line construction costs, trade improves upon total welfare while prices are
not equalized.
Clearly, it is profitable for region T to increase the transmission capacity K
up to price equalization:
dWT
dK
=
µ
dp
dK
− dp
dK
¶
K.
As already mentioned, region H would find profitable to limit this capacity to
a level KR such that
KR =
µ
dp
dK
− dp
dK
¶−1 ¡
p− p
¢
.
Yet, it is in the overall interest to constraint region H to export up to price
equalization:
dWT
dK
+
dWH
dK
=
¡
p− p
¢
.
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